One of the advantages of conduct parameter games is that they enable estimation of market power without total cost data. In line with this, we develop a conduct parameter based model to estimate the …rm speci…c "marginal cost e¢ ciency"and conduct without using total cost data. The marginal cost e¢ ciency is an alternative measure of e¢ ciency that is based on deadweight loss. We illustrate our methodology by estimating …rm-route-quarter speci…c conducts and marginal cost e¢ ciencies of U.S. airlines for Chicago based routes without using route-level total cost data.
Introduction
The Lerner index (1934) is a widely used market power measure, which is the ratio of price-marginal cost mark-up and price. One of the di¢ culties for calculating the Lerner index is that total cost data may not be available making the estimation of the marginal cost di¢ cult. A solution to this problem is estimating a conduct parameter (or conjectural variations) game 1 in which …rms form conjectures about the variation in other …rms'strategies (e.g., output) in response to a change in their own strategies. For given demand and cost conditions, the conjectures corresponding to the observed price-cost margins can be estimated "as-if" the …rms are playing a conduct parameter game. In this setting, the "implied marginal cost" can be estimated via a supply-demand system.
Stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) literature 2 su¤ers from a similar problem. That is, the standard SFA models require total cost data in order to estimate the cost e¢ ciency of a …rm. Moreover, as we will describe in the next section, market power and e¢ ciency are closely related concepts and ignoring ine¢ ciency in a conduct parameter model may lead to inconsistent conduct parameter estimates. What is more, ignoring the ine¢ ciencies of productive units may invalidate the standard deadweight loss (DWL) calculations since DWL from collusive behavior depends on ine¢ ciency levels.
3 If the productive units exhibit ine¢ ciency that is misinterpreted as …rm heterogeneity, then the standard calculations of DWL become invalid. In such cases, Kutlu and Sickles (2012) recommend using what they call the e¢ cient full marginal cost (EFMC) for markup calculation. 4 Hence, estimation of conduct, marginal cost, and marginal cost e¢ ciency would be essential for a valid DWL calculation. We overcome all these issues by combining conduct parameter and SFA literatures so as to generalize a conventional conduct parameter model to allow ine¢ ciency in marginal cost. This enables the estimation of marginal cost e¢ ciencies and conduct parameters jointly and consistently without using total cost data. In contrast to the SFA literature, which infers cost e¢ ciency from a cost function, we estimate the marginal cost e¢ ciency from a supply-demand system that is derived from our conduct parameter game. This introduces a related but di¤erent measure of e¢ ciency that is based on deadweight loss (DWL), i.e., marginal cost e¢ ciency. Therefore, the marginal cost e¢ ciency concept would be a valuable tool for antitrust 1 See Perlo¤ et al. (2007) and Bresnahan (1989) for more details on conduct parameter approach.
2 See Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003) for a book-length survey on SFA and Sickles (2005) for a simulation study examining the performances of some estimators in the SFA literature.
3 See Comanor and Leibenstein (1969) and Kutlu and Sickles (2012) for more details about calculation of DWL when …rms are ine¢ cient. 4 Kutlu and Sickles (2012) de…ne EFMC as the sum of a shadow cost and e¢ cient marginal cost that is calculated using stochastic frontier analysis techniques. The shadow cost re ‡ects the constraints that the …rms face such as capacity or incentive compatibility constraints. E¢ cient marginal cost is the marginal cost when the …rm achieves full e¢ ciency. Although they de…ne the EFMC concept, they calculate EFMC using cost e¢ ciency estimates obtained from a standard stochastic cost frontier model. Hence, while the concept is due to Kutlu and Sickles (2012) , arguably, we develop a more proper method that can directly calculate EFMC. duct and DWL estimates may be biased if a conventional conduct parameter model, which ignores marginal cost ine¢ ciency, is used.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we brie ‡y discuss the relationship between market power and e¢ ciency. In Section 3, we build up our theoretical model. In Section 4, we describe our data set, present our empirical model, and discuss our results. In the next section, we make our concluding remarks. Finally, in the Appendix, we present extensions of the theoretical model.
Market Power and E¢ ciency
"The Quiet Life Hypothesis" (QLH) by Hicks (1935) and "the E¢ cient Structure Hypothesis"(ESH) by Demsetz (1973) are two well-known hypotheses that relate market power to e¢ ciency. The former claims that higher competitive pressure is likely to force management work harder, which in turn increases e¢ ciencies of …rms. The latter states that the …rms with superior e¢ ciency levels use their competitive advantages to gain larger market shares, which leads to higher market concentration and thus higher market power. The …ndings of Berger and Hannan (1998) and Kutlu and Sickles (2012) support the QLH for the banking and airline industries, respectively. However, Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2007) show evidence for ESH applicable to the banking industry. Delis and Tsionas (2009) are in favor of the QLH on average but acknowledge that the ESH may prevail in the case of for the highly e¢ cient banks. The relationship between market power and e¢ ciency has long been acknowledged by economists. However, market power and SFA literatures largely ignore this relationship. Delis and Tsionas (2009) , Koetter and Poghosyan (2009) , Koetter et al. (2012) , and Kutlu and Sickles (2012) exemplify some studies that attempt to estimate the market powers of …rms in frameworks where …rms are allowed to be ine¢ cient. Except for Delis and Tsionas (2009) , the market power estimates in these studies are conditional on e¢ ciency estimates.
In conduct parameter models, ignoring marginal cost ine¢ ciency can potentially cause inconsistent conduct parameter estimates. In particular, the conduct parameter estimates may pick up some of the marginal cost ine¢ ciency. Delis and Tsionas (2009) argue that if the ine¢ ciency is not taken into account, the optimization model of …rms become irrelevant, which would lead to severe bias as the level of ine¢ ciency increases. Similarly, ignoring market power (conduct parameter) can potentially cause inconsistent cost e¢ ciency or marginal cost ef…ciency estimates. The di¤erences in market powers would lead to di¤erent …rm behavior and this can be confused with the …rm level ine¢ ciency. Generally, e¢ ciencies are measured by closeness of production units to the best-practice units observed in the market. If the …rm level conducts a¤ect the performance of the best-practice units, then the e¢ ciency estimates which do not take this into account would not be accurate. For instance, in a market facing a Cournot competition the best practicing …rm may not really be fully e¢ cient.
11 As mentioned in the introduction, our methodology aims to overcome these di¢ culties by explicitly and simultaneously modeling conduct parameter and marginal cost e¢ ciency.
Theoretical Model
In this section, we describe the theoretical framework, used to estimate marginal cost e¢ ciencies and conducts of …rms without total cost data. The stochastic frontier literature relaxes full e¢ ciency assumption of neoclassical production theory by allowing the …rms to be ine¢ cient. The ine¢ ciency is treated as an unobserved component, which is captured by a one-sided error term. In the conventional stochastic frontier framework, the cost e¢ ciencies of …rms would be estimated by the following model:
( 1) where q it is the quantity of …rm i at time t; X c;it is a vector of variables related to cost; u it 0 is a term which is capturing the ine¢ ciency; v it is the usual two-sided error term; and C is the deterministic component of cost when …rms achieve full e¢ ciency. A variety of distributions are proposed for u it including the half normal (Aigner, et al., 1977) , exponential (Meeusen and van den Broeck, 1977) , truncated normal (Stevenson, 1980) , and gamma (Greene, 1980a (Greene, , 1980b (Greene, , 2003 distributions. The cost e¢ ciency of a …rm, EF F it , is estimated by:
The stochastic frontier approach requires detailed cost data, which many times is not available. We utilize the conduct parameter approach to overcome this issue. For this purpose, instead of modelling total cost as in the conventional SFA models, we directly model marginal cost, c, as follows:
where c is the deterministic component of marginal cost when …rms achieve full e¢ ciency; u it 0 is a term which is capturing the marginal cost ine¢ ciency; and v it is a two-sided random variable, which is observed by the …rm but not observed by the researcher. We call c e¢ cient marginal cost (EMC). Rather than estimating a cost function, we estimate a supply-demand system that enables us to calculate the marginal cost e¢ ciency. From the antitrust point of view, which is concerned with market power and DWL estimations, the marginal cost e¢ ciency is a more relevant e¢ ciency concept compared to the cost e¢ ciency concept.
Let P t = P (Q t ; X d;t ) be the inverse demand function, Q t be the total quantity, and X d;t is a vector of demand related variables at time t. The perceived marginal revenue (PMR) is given by:
Qt is the market share of …rm i at time t; E t = @Qt @Pt
Pt
Qt is the (absolute value of) elasticity of demand; it = @Qt @qit is the conduct parameter. Three benchmark values for it = n 0; 1;
1 sit o correspond to perfect competition, Cournot competition, and joint pro…t maximization, respectively. The supply relation is:
where c it = c (q it ; X c;it ). After including the econometric error terms, the supply relation becomes:
where g it = g ( it ; s it ; E t ) = ln 1 sit Et it 0 is the market power term, which is an increasing function of it ; u it 0 is the ine¢ ciency term; and " s it is the two-sided error term.
The E t term is identi…ed through the demand equation. Intuitively, Equation (4) suggests that if c it and q it are highly collinear, then the conduct parameter may be identi…ed through the variation in @Pt @Qt . We assume that the demand and marginal cost functions are such that the conduct parameter and marginal cost can be separately identi…ed.
14 In most cases, identi…cation is a problem when the demand function is linear. For example, when the demand and marginal cost functions are linear, we do not observe a variation in @Pt @Qt , and c it and q it are perfectly collinear. In this case, we cannot separately identify the 1 2 Note that perceived marginal revenue must be positive so that the equilibrium makes sense. Hence, we assume that 1 s it E t it > 0. So, we have ln 1
0.
1 3 The introduction of the error term enables us to deviate from a single market price. Also, the price may be considered to be a function of …rm speci…c variables, X d;it .
1 4 For details about the identi…cation conditions for conduct parameter models, we direct the reader to Bresnahan (1982) , Lau (1982) , Perlo¤ et al. (2007) , and Perlo¤ and Shen (2012) . conduct parameter and marginal cost. One way to achieve identi…cation is assuming constant marginal cost. 15 Another commonly used approach that does not require constant marginal cost assumption is including the cross-product of quantity and an exogenous variable in the demand equation. When such cross-products are included in the model, the identi…cation of conduct parameter is achieved through both parallel shifts and rotations of the demand curve. Bresnahan (1982) illustrates how identi…cation can be achieved by such rotations for the linear demand and linear marginal cost case. He states that the logic of identi…cation is maintained even if the curves are not linear. In general, the conduct parameter is identi…able if the inverse demand function is not separable in exogenous variables, Z, and the number of exogenous variables is enough. More precisely, we can write the inverse demand function P so that P = f (Q; r (Z)) where Z is a vector of exogenous variables but P does not take the form P = Q 1= r (Z) + h (Q) for some functions f , r, and h if and only if the identi…cation is impossible.
Our model is di¤erent from the standard market power models due to the additional u it term. This ine¢ ciency term, u it , is identi…ed by utilizing the asymmetric distribution of the composed error term, i.e., u it + " s it . Intuitively, u it is identi…ed if the signal-to-noise ratio (the variance ratio of the ine¢ ciency component to the composed error) is not small. Hence, the identi…cation of model parameters requires the standard conduct parameter model and stochastic frontier model identi…cation assumptions to hold when there are endogenous variables.
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Following Kutlu and Sickles (2012) , Figure 1 aims to illustrate the underlying mechanism of our model and consequences of ignoring ine¢ ciency when calculating DWL. The …gure includes inverse demand function, perceived marginal revenue (PMR), marginal revenue (MR) that is corresponding to monopoly scenario, marginal cost (MC), and e¢ cient marginal cost (EMC). For illustrative purposes, we consider the same constant marginal costs, conducts, and e¢ ciencies for each …rm. P and Q are the equilibrium price and quantity at conduct level . Similarly, P C and Q C are price and quantity for the perfect competition scenario in which conduct equals 0. In the …gure, it is assumed that under perfect competition there would be no ine¢ ciency. If QLH holds, then as the market power, measured by , increases MC diverges from EMC. In our framework, the marginal cost e¢ ciency is de…ned as EM C=M C. The social welfare loss at conduct level would be equal to the shaded area (sum of dark and light shaded regions). In Figure 1 , the e¢ ciency is roughly 60%, which is relatively low.
17 As a result the social welfare loss due to ine¢ ciency is substantial. The conventional DWL value, which is ignoring ine¢ ciency, is given by the dark shaded triangular area; and is much smaller than the overall social welfare loss. When there is heterogeneity either in e¢ ciencies or marginal cost frontiers of …rms (under constant MC assumption), the calculation of DWL would be similar except that EMC would be a step function rather than a horizontal line.
Figure 1: Conduct, marginal cost e¢ ciency, and social welfare Now, we describe how this conduct parameter game would be estimated. We assume that the conduct parameter it is a function of variables, X g;it , that a¤ect …rm speci…c market power such as market shares and concentration ratios.
Modeling it through this function may lead to computational di¢ culties. In contrast, g it can be modeled directly as a function of X g;it so that it is solved after getting the parameter estimates. That is, we can calculate the estimate of it as follows:
whereÊ t andĝ it are the estimates for E t and g it , respectively. The market power term, g it , is bounded by 0 and B it = ln 1 1 Et . It follows that the choice of functional form should be so that g it 2 [0; B it ]. In this study, we use:
One of the drawbacks of the standard stochastic frontier models is that if the regressors are correlated with v it or u it , then the parameter and e¢ ciency estimates are inconsistent. In this setting, v it and u it terms are assumed to be independent, which can be a questionable assumption in a variety of settings. Similar to Kutlu (2010) , Karakaplan and Kutlu (2017a, b) , and Kutlu et al. (2018) , we use a limited information maximum likelihood based approach to handle the endogeneity issue that occurs when the two-sided error term is correlated with the regressors or u it . The approach solves the endogeneity issue by including a bias correction term in the model. For example, u it can be a function of regressors (e.g., market shares of …rms or concentration ratios) that are correlated with the two-sided error term. Consider the following supply relation model with endogenous explanatory variables:
where P it is the price; X en;it is an m 1 vector of all endogenous variables used in modelling c it , g it , and u it ; it = I m Z it where Z it is a l 1 (with l m) vector of all exogenous variables. The irregular term " s it is correlated with the regressors but independent ofũ it conditional on X en;it and Z it .
18 Hence, " s it is independent of u it conditional on X en;it and Z it . Note that " 
where" s it
. The parameters of this supply relation can be estimated in one stage with the maximum likelihood estimation method. However, sometimes it is simpler to get the consistent parameter estimates in two stages by …rst estimating the bias correction term 0 X en;it 0 it and then including the estimate of bias correction term in the second stage where we apply traditional SFA methods. 19 For the two-stage approach, the standard errors need to be corrected, e.g., by a bootstrap procedure. In our empirical section, we use the limited information maximum likelihood estimator that we presented in this section, i.e., the one-stage method. Amsler et al. (2016 Amsler et al. ( , 2017 relax the conditional independence assumption for " s it andũ it by using a copula approach. Kutlu et al. (2018) show by simulations that if the …rm-speci…c individual e¤ects are included in the model, even if " s it andũ it are correlated conditionally, the estimates are still reasonable. When it is di¢ cult to …nd instruments for endogenous variables, one may use the copula approach proposed by Tran and Tsionas (2015) . Their model does not require the availability of outside information. Instead, to obtain the instruments, a ‡exible joint distribution of the endogenous variables and composed error is constructed. If the researcher is inclined to use Bayesian methods, the stochastic frontier model of Gri¢ ths and Hajargasht (2016) can be applied to our framework. Traditional stochastic frontier models impose ine¢ cient behavior on all …rms. If it is believed there is a mixture of e¢ cient and ine¢ cient …rms in the sample, it is possible to apply the model of Tran and Tsionas (2016) . 20 Finally, one can disentangle …rm speci…c heterogeneity from ine¢ ciency by using variations of true-…xed e¤ects (or true-random e¤ects) model of Greene (2005a Greene ( , 2005b ) that allow endogeneity as in Kutlu et al. (2018) . For example, in the airport and banking cost e¢ ciency contexts Kutlu et al. (2018) and Kutlu and McCarthy (2017) , respectively, illustrate that e¢ ciency estimates can be substantially di¤erent if productive unit heterogeneity is not controlled in the estimations.
In the stochastic frontier model that we presented, we have exogenous and endogenous regressors along with some "outside instruments."Hence, our identi…cation assumptions are somewhat di¤erent from the standard stochastic frontier models without endogenous variables. Our main identi…cation assumption is that the exogenous variables (including the outside instruments) are uncorrelated with " s it and w it and that there are enough instruments. If " s it and w it are independent of the exogenous variables (including the outside instruments), then for each endogenous variable and its functions a single control function would be enough to achieve identi…cation. For example, if z is a valid instrument for an endogenous variable x, then the model parameters can be identi…ed by a single control function even when the model has x and x 2 as regressors.
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In order to make our contribution clearer, we …nalize this section by comparing our model with two closely related papers. Kutlu and Sickles (2012) consider a dynamic conduct parameter model in which under the full market power scenario the …rms play an e¢ cient super-game equilibrium where the …rms cooperate subject to incentive compatibility constraints. They estimate a market speci…c aggregate model and assume that the corresponding aggregate incentive compatibility constraint is a function of e¢ ciency. The only place that e¢ ciency enters their model is within the incentive compatibility constraint causing the parameter estimates from the static counterpart of their model to be invariant to the presence of ine¢ ciency. This contrasts with our setting as our static model directly includes ine¢ ciency in the supply equation. For their static model, the presence of e¢ ciency matters only in the calculation of DWL. Although Kutlu and Sickles (2012) introduce the marginal cost e¢ ciency concept, they assume that marginal cost e¢ ciency equals cost e¢ ciency (in the SFA sense), which is a somewhat strong assumption. Hence, they simply estimate a stochastic frontier cost function to obtain the cost e¢ ciencies of the …rms. A direct implication of this is that their dynamic model requires total cost data.
In another closely related study, Delis and Tsionas (2009) estimate a supplydemand-cost system where the cost function is modeled in the SFA framework. Hence, this study requires total cost data and e¢ ciency concept is cost e¢ ciency in the SFA sense. Their supply equation is derived from a standard conduct parameter model, which is invariant to the presence of ine¢ ciency, and cost ine¢ ciency enters their model only through the stochastic frontier cost function. This contrasts with our setting as our model directly includes (marginal cost) ine¢ ciency in the supply equation. As a …nal remark, supply equation of Delis and Tsionas (2009) has revenue as the dependent variable and the right-handside variables include cross products of (total) cost with many other variables, which are expected to be endogenous in this setting. This complication may pose some estimation related di¢ culties if not controlled properly.
The Data
In order to testify our theoretical framework, we use the U.S. domestic airline data. One of the main data sources that we use is the Passenger OriginDestination Survey of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DB1B data set). This data set is a 10% random sample of all tickets that originate in the U.S. on domestic ‡ights. In our data set a market is de…ned as a directional city-pair (route). Calculation of prices and quantities are based on the tickets that have no more than three segments in each direction. Approximately 1% of tickets are eliminated during the elimination of tickets with more than 3 segments. We only focus on coach class tickets due to the di¤erences in demand elasticities and other characteristics between coach class and high-end classes (…rst class and business class).
Our data set covers the time period from the …rst quarter of 1999 to fourth quarter of 2009. During this time period, the U.S. airlines faced serious …nancial problems. As pointed out by Duygun et al. (2016) , the …nancial losses for domestic passenger airline operations during this time period were substantially higher than their losses between 1979 and 1999. Increase in taxes and jet fuel prices, relatively low fares, and sharp decrease in demand were some of the challenges facing U.S. airlines. During this time period, there were dramatic increases in load factors. Borenstein (2011) argues that such an increase might be attributed to improved yield management techniques.
We provide the details about data construction process as follows. First, all multi-destination tickets are dropped as it is di¢ cult to identify the ticket's origin and destination without knowing the exact purpose of the trip. Second, any itinerary that involves international ‡ights was eliminated. Third, the fare class for high-end carrier was adjusted. That is, for some airlines, due to marketing strategies, only …rst class and business class (high-end) tickets are provided to consumers on all routes. However, the quality should be taken as coach class.
For such airlines, if there is no coach class tickets from a certain carrier in a given quarter, we consider all tickets as coach class tickets. Fourth, tickets that have high-end segments and unknown fare classes were dropped.
Following Borenstein (1989) and Brueckner, Dyer, and Spiller (1992) , we assume that ticketing carrier is the relevant airline. After further elimination of multi-ticketing-carrier tickets, …rm speci…c average segment numbers (SEG) and average stage length (SL) on a given route are calculated as indicators for quality and costs. Moreover, our data set includes a distance variable which is the shortest directional ‡ight distance (DIST ). A ticket is online when the one-way ticket does not involve change of airplanes. The online variable is the percentage of online tickets.
For the price variable, we use the average price of all tickets for a given airline on a given route in given quarter. 22 All tickets with incredible 23 prices are dropped from our data set. Following Borenstein (1989) and Ito and Lee (2007) , we eliminate the open-jaw tickets since it would be di¢ cult to distribute the ticket price into outbound and inbound segment for open jaw tickets. We drop the tickets that have a price less than 25 dollars or higher than 99 percentile or more than 2:5 times standard deviation from the mean for each airline within a route. The tickets that have price less than 25 dollars are considered as frequent ‡yer program tickets and the tickets that have prices higher than 99 percentile are considered to be input (key punch) errors for the data set. For the round trip tickets, we divided the total price by two to get the one-way price.
The cost data set is constructed from the …rm level data of DOT's airline production data set (based on Form 41 and T 100).
24 While the airline-speci…c total cost data are available for the whole U.S. airline industry, the route-airlinespeci…c total cost data are not available. We control for three types of important costs: labor price (LP ), energy price (EP ), and capital price (KP ). The salaries and bene…ts for …ve main types of personnel are provided in Form 41/P6. Annual employee number is given in Form 41, P10. We interpolated the annual employee data to get the quarterly values. For energy price, we only capture the cost based on aircraft fuel. The energy input is developed by combining information on aircraft fuel gallons used with expense data per period. Flight capital is described by the average size (measured in number of seats) of the ‡eet. The number of aircraft that a carrier operated from each di¤erent model of aircraft in airline's ‡eet is collected from DOT Form 41. For each quarter, the average number of aircraft in service is calculated by dividing the total number of aircraft days for all aircraft types by the number of days in the quarter. This serves as an approximate measure of the size of ‡eet.
In order to estimate the demand, we also include the city speci…c demographic variables: per capita income (P CI) and population (P OP ). We obtained the city level per capita income and population data from Bureau of Labor Statistics. We interpolate the annual data to get the quarterly P CI and population variables for each city. For each origin-destination city-pair, we use the population weighted P CI as the route-speci…c P CI measure. Similarly, city-pair population is the average population of origination and destination cities. In order to get the real prices, we de ‡ated the nominal prices by Consumer Price Index (CP I) and use the …rst quarter of 1999 as the base time period. Because metropolitan areas have available demographic information whereas airports located in small cities do not, the number of the city-pairs is further reduced in our …nal data set.
We apply our theoretical method on the routes that originate from Chicago, which is a popular choice because of its relatively large airport and wide selection of airline …rms. For instance, Brander and Zhang (1990) use 33 Chicago-based routes in their studies. In our …nal data set, we further eliminate the small …rms and small routes. On a given route, small …rms with market shares less than 0:01 are eliminated. For a given quarter, any route with enplanements less than 1800, i.e., 20 passengers per day or routes with less than 30 observations are dropped from the analysis. Table 1 presents the summary statistics for Chicago-based routes. Low cost carrier (LCC) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ticketing carrier is a low cost carrier, otherwise it is 0. Number of …rms represents the total number of …rms that operate on the route. The total number of passengers is the total number of tickets sold on a given route by all airlines together in a given quarter. Total number of passengers for other routes (OQOT H) variable is the total number of tickets that are sold on the all other routes that share the same origination city. We use the geometric market share (GEOS) variable of Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) as an instrument. 25 Another instrumental variable that we use is GEON F . This variable is the product of GEOS and nf = p n o n d , where n o denotes to the mean value of number of …rms for all routes that share the same origination as route of interest while the n d refers to the mean value of number of …rms for all routes that share the same destination city. The …nal data set contains 108 routes that originate from Chicago and 14 carriers. The low cost carriers are Frontier Airlines, JetBlue Airways, Southwest Airlines, and Spirit Airlines. The remaining carriers are: Alaska Airlines, American Airlines, Continental Airlines, Delta Airlines, Northwest Airlines, United Airlines, US Airways, America West Airlines, ATA Airlines, and Trans World Airways.
Empirical Example
The purpose of this section is providing an empirical example for our theoretical model. In particular, we estimate time-varying …rm-route-speci…c conducts and marginal cost e¢ ciencies of U.S. airlines for Chicago based routes. Like Brander and Zhang (1990) and Oum et al. (1993) , we only consider coach class tickets. Brander and Zhang (1990) conclude that there is Cournot type competition in the airline industry, i.e., competition is quantity based. Hence, we assume a quantity based competition.
26 Our city-pair markets consist of one-way or round-trip directional trips having up to three segments in each direction. We divide the total ticket price by 2 to get the one-way fare for round-trip tickets. The demand and supply equations are estimated separately. The market demand equation is given by:
where f d is a function of demand related variables, Q tr is the total quantity at time t for route r, X d;itr is a vector of demand related variables, and " d itr is the conventional two-sided error term. We assume that ln Q tr and ln P CI tr ln Q tr are endogenous. Along with the exogenous variables included in the demand model, our instrumental variables are GEOS itr , GEON F itr , ln OQOT H rt , logarithm of labor price (ln LP it ), logarithm of capital price (ln KP it ), and logarithm of energy price (ln EP it ).
The supply equation is given by:
where c itr is the marginal cost when …rms achieve full e¢ ciency, g itr = ln 1 sitr Etr itr is the market power term, u itr 0 is the ine¢ ciency term, and " s itr is the conventional two sided error term. The parameters of the E tr term is identi…ed through the demand equation. We assume that the e¢ cient marginal cost, c itr , is constant with respect to quantity, i.e., it is not a function of quantity but maybe a function of exogenous cost shifters. Hence, as we described in the theoretical model section, the theoretical values for cost and marginal cost e¢ -ciencies coincide in this model. Although constant marginal cost is a relatively strong assumption, it is commonly used in the conduct parameter models. Iwata (1974) , Genesove and Mullin (1998) , Corts (1999) , and Puller (2007) exemplify some papers that use this assumption in a variety of conduct parameter settings. We use this simplifying assumption to illustrate our methodology. Nevertheless, we approximate the e¢ cient marginal cost function by a fairly ‡exible function of input prices and other cost related exogenous variables. These cost related variables include year, quarter, and airline dummy variables, which capture time-…rm-speci…c unobserved factors. 27 Moreover, constant marginal cost assumption is not unreasonable at least around the equilibrium as there is substantial empirical evidence supporting constant returns to scale for the airline industry. We model g itr as in the theoretical model section and assume that X g;itr = (s itr ; CR 4;tr ; ln DIST r ; t; E tr ; 1) 0 where CR 4;tr is the concentration ratio for largest four …rms on route r at time t. We assume that u itr = h itrũitr andũ itr N + 0; For the supply side, s itr and CR 4;tr are assumed to be endogenous. Our instrumental variables are GEOS itr , GEON F itr , ln P OP tr , and ln P CI tr . The estimations of the supply relations are done by using the limited information maximum likelihood estimation method that we described in our theoretical model section.
Results
In this section, we present our estimation results. The demand parameter estimates for the routes originating from Chicago are given in Table 2 . We estimated the inverse demand equation by 2SLS. Our demand model controls for year, 2 7 If the airlines are playing a version of dynamic conduct parameters game that is suggested by Puller (2009) , route-speci…c time dummy variables would capture dynamic factors that enter the airlines' optimization problems as well. In this case, the estimates of parameters, conduct parameters, and e¢ ciencies would still be consistent. However, the marginal cost estimates may be downward biased as the prediction of marginal costs include these dynamic factors. Nevertheless, the e¢ cient full marginal cost estimates would be consistent.
quarter, and airline. The demand elasticities are negative at each observation, i.e., E tr > 0. For the supply function, as we described previously, we use the one-stage limited information maximum likelihood approach to deal with endogeneity. In 2 8 Recall that we de…ne Et =
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order to illustrate the consequences of ignoring marginal cost ine¢ ciency, we estimated two supply models: the …rst one allows ine¢ ciency (benchmark model) and the second one assumes full e¢ ciency so that u itr = 0 (full-e¢ ciency model). The full-e¢ ciency model is a standard conduct parameter model, which helps us to compare our benchmark estimates with the standard conduct parameter models. Both models include airline, year, and quarter dummy variables. 29 Table 3 shows the estimation results. The bias correction terms ( ) are jointly signi…cant at any conventional signi…cance level, which is an indication of endogeneity. The median of the conduct estimates from the benchmark model is 0:63, which is lower than the theoretical conduct value for Cournot competition, 1.
30 At the median, the extent of competition lies somewhere between perfect competition and Cournot competition. The median of conduct estimates from the full-e¢ ciency model is somewhat lower, 0:22, suggesting a competitive market. In other words, when we allow ine¢ ciency, the median conduct is closer to Cournot competition benchmark, i.e., = 1; and when we assume full ef…ciency, the median conduct is closer to perfect competition benchmark, i.e., = 0. Moreover, the Kolmogorov-Smirmov test rejects the equality of the distributions at any conventional signi…cance levels. This illustrates the importance of considering marginal cost ine¢ ciency when estimating a conduct parameter model.
LCCs, due to their special operating style 31 , tend to have lower marginal costs compared to other airlines, which helps them to o¤er lower fares. Hence, it is worthwhile to examine the decomposition of conducts based on LCCs and nonLCCs. Our conduct estimates from the benchmark model for LCC and non-LCC carriers are 0:24 and 0:74, respectively. Therefore, while the conducts of LCCs are closer to perfectly competitive values, the conducts of non-LCCs are closer to Cournot competition values. The corresponding estimates from the fulle¢ ciency model are 0:11 and 0:25, indicating relatively competitive markets for both LCCs and non-LCCs. Hence, ignoring ine¢ ciency leads to underestimation of conducts for both LCCs and non-LCCs. The underestimation of welfare loss is boosted by the fact that the full-e¢ ciency model ignores the marginal cost ine¢ ciency.
2 9 Hence, as we illustrate in the Appendix, our parameter and e¢ ciency estimates are consistent even when the marginal costs are stochastic.
3 0 The median of theoretical conduct values for joint pro…t maximization scenario is 6:77, which is the median of The conduct parameter estimates show that an airline with higher market share tends to have higher market power. In markets with high CR 4 values, it may be easier for airlines with higher market share to cooperate. The positive coe¢ cient of CR 4 in conduct veri…es this. For the time period that we examine, the U.S. airlines seem to be losing market power over time. For longer ‡ight distances the alternative transportation means (e.g., bus or car) are likely to become less attractive to the consumers. This reduction in outside competition suggests a positive relationship between market power and distance. The positive coe¢ cient of distance variable for the market power term is in line with this intuition.
In Figure 2 and 3, the e¢ ciency and conduct estimates from our benchmark model are presented. In our benchmark estimates, the median e¢ ciency estimates for the whole sample and non-LCC carriers are 82:6% and 84:4%, respectively. Hence, the e¢ ciencies of LCCs and non-LCCs are similar. The parameter estimates for the ine¢ ciency term show that an airline with higher market share tends to have higher ine¢ ciency. Moreover, higher CR 4 values lead to lower ef…ciency and the correlation between conduct parameter and e¢ ciency is 0:19, which is statistically signi…cant at any conventional signi…cance level. These are in line with the QLH which postulates that higher market power leads to lower e¢ ciency levels.
32 Based on our benchmark model, the medians of pricemarginal cost markups, price-e¢ cient marginal cost markups, and prices are $4:65, $30:32, and $140:46, respectively. However, for the full-e¢ ciency model, the median of price-marginal cost markups is $2:49. Historically, airlines have been challenged in their e¤orts to generate high pro…ts. These markup values from our benchmark model indicate that airlines may partially be responsible for the …nancial di¢ culties that they face. Our study shows that the answer to achieving reasonable pro…t levels may be through improving e¢ ciency. Finally, we calculate a lower bound for bias in DWL estimates when the researchers use the full-e¢ ciency model instead of the benchmark model. This number is obtained by estimating the shaded rectangular area between M C, EM C, and Q (see Figure 1) where we assume that Q equals total observed quantity on a given route in a given quarter. The median of the lower bound over all routes and quarters is $427; 715. This area measures the DWL that is caused by e¢ ciency loss only. Hence, the DWL due to misallocation of quantity that stems from e¢ ciency loss is not included.
33 Nevertheless, this lower bound clearly illustrates the severe consequences of ignoring marginal cost ine¢ ciency when evaluating welfare loss using the conventional conduct parameter models.
Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we provided a conduct parameter based framework to estimate market powers and (marginal cost) e¢ ciencies of …rms simultaneously. Our methodology enables us to relax the total cost data requirement for stochastic frontier models. Total cost data may not be available for a variety of reasons. For example, …rms might not want to reveal this potentially strategic information. Even when some form of total cost data are available, the data may not re ‡ect the total cost of the relevant unit that we want to examine. For instance, in our empirical example, for the U.S. airlines only …rm speci…c total cost data is available for the entire U.S. airline system. In such cases, the conventional stochastic frontier models cannot estimate …rm-route speci…c e¢ ciencies as this would require …rm-route speci…c total cost data.
Besides relaxing a vital data requirement, our methodology aims to overcome some estimation issues. E¢ ciencies are generally measured by the distance between the units of production and the best practice units observed in the market. If the performance of the best-practice units depends on their market powers, then the e¢ ciency estimates that are not taking this into account would not be accurate. We overcome this di¢ culty by explicitly modeling a conduct parameter game in an environment where …rms are allowed to be ine¢ cient.
In the Appendix, we provide extensions of our model for a variety of di¤erent settings including capacity constraints, stochastic marginal costs, multi-output …rms, and dynamic strategic interactions. Another potential extension of our conduct parameter model is so that the …rms price discriminate. For example, the marginal cost e¢ ciency concept can be incorporated into the conduct parameter games of Kutlu (2012a Kutlu ( , 2017a and Kutlu and Sickles (2017) . Such an extension would enable us to understand the connection between price discrimination, market power, and e¢ ciency better. 34 Hence, our theoretical model serves as a guideline as to how conduct parameter and e¢ ciency can be estimated simultaneously without requiring total cost data. Our guideline can be applied to a variety of conduct parameter settings. As for the standard DWL calculations, our e¢ ciency measure for marginal cost does not consider the …xed costs for the short run. It is possible to consider dynamic frameworks where prior investments and R&D may a¤ect …xed costs and marginal costs. Hence, suboptimal investment decisions may result in suboptimal marginal cost levels even when the marginal cost may seem optimal in a single time horizon for given investment and R&D levels. This type of e¢ ciency is not controlled in our conduct parameter model or in a standard stochastic frontier model. Moreover, similar to the standard stochastic frontier models, we assume that the input market is perfectly competitive. Hence, our model ignores potential market power in the input markets. The advantage of our framework over SFA setting is that we can make such structural extensions relatively easier compared to SFA setting using the already-established industrial organization literature.
We applied our methodology to estimate the conducts and marginal cost e¢ ciencies of the U.S. airlines for the Chicago based routes between 1999I-2009IV. We found that the market concentration and market share of airlines are negatively related to the marginal cost e¢ ciency, which is in line with the QLH. We also found that the conduct and DWL estimations may be seriously distorted if ine¢ ciency is ignored. A more extensive empirical study is warranted but we consider this outside the scope of this paper. For example, a future study may consider a more complete list of U.S. routes and a longer time period. Moreover, although we control for the airline speci…c factors by including airline and time dummy variables, a study including variables related to on time rate, food service, aircraft engine information, and aircraft seat speci…cation may be worth exploring.
References 9 Appendix: Extensions of Theoretical Model
The theoretical model we presented illustrates how the marginal cost e¢ ciency concept can be incorporated to a simple yet commonly used conduct parameter model. It is possible to apply similar ideas to a variety of di¤erent conduct parameter models. In this appendix, we brie ‡y present some alternative frameworks where marginal cost e¢ ciency concept can be used.
Capacity Constraints
Our model can be extended to a setting in which …rms have capacity constraints. This extension of our model is inspired by the conduct parameter model proposed by Puller (2007) . In the presence of capacity constraints the optimization problem for …rm i becomes:
where K it is the capacity constraint that …rm i is facing at time t. The …rst order conditions for the corresponding conduct parameter game are:
where it 0 is the shadow cost of capacity which can be estimated by including variables capturing extent of capacity constraints. For example, Puller (2007) uses a dummy variable, which is equals one when a constraint is binding. If we letc it = c it + it andc it = c it + it , as earlier we have:
The presence of it may make it di¢ cult to estimate this model. A solution may be to use an ine¢ ciency variable, r it 0, which enters the equation additively:
where c it = c it + r it , r it N + r ; 2 r , and " s it is the usual two-sided error term.
In line with the standard stochastic frontier models, in our original model the realized marginal cost (c it ) is assumed to be a multiple of minimum (frontier) marginal cost (c it ); and the ratio of e¢ cient marginal cost to realized marginal cost (c it =c it ) is de…ned as marginal cost e¢ ciency. In this setting, the realized marginal cost is assumed to follow ln c it = ln c it +u it where u it 0.
35 E¢ ciency is calculated using the estimates from this log-transformed multiplicative form by Ef f it = c it =c it = exp ( u it ). In this example, the ine¢ ciency term, r it , enters the model additively. Hence, r it measures the marginal cost e¢ ciency additively. That is, we model the realized marginal cost by c it = c it + r it where r it 0. Similar to its multiplicative counterpart, this model additively measures how large the realized marginal cost is relative to the e¢ cient marginal cost. After estimating the parameters of the additive model, e¢ ciency can be estimated by Ef f it = c it =c it = c it = (c it + r it ). Depending on the structural model used, the researcher may …nd either multiplicative, u it , or additive, r it , versions of e¢ ciency variable convenient. However, it seems that for the game theoretic models, the additive version may be more frequently needed.
Stochastic Marginal Cost
Until now we considered models where the …rms have perfect information about the marginal costs. However, …rms may not always have perfect information about their marginal costs. In such cases, they would maximize their expected pro…ts. We provide a simple example for how this issue can be handled in our framework. Assume that the marginal costs of the …rms are stochastic in the sense that:
where the ine¢ ciency level, u it , and the distribution of v it N (0; 2 v ) is known by the …rms but v it is not observed by neither the …rms nor the researcher. In this scenario, the perceived marginal revenue would be equal to the expected marginal cost. As earlier, the perceived marginal revenue is given by:
The expectation of marginal cost is given by:
= c it exp (u it ) exp 1 2 v . Hence, after adding the error term, the supply equation for …rm i is given by:
ln P it = + ln c it + g it + u it + "
This supply equation is the same as the deterministic cost function scenario except for the addition of the constant term, . If v it is heteroskedastic so that v it N (0; 2 vi ) where 2 vi is …rm speci…c, the model becomes: ln P it = i + ln c it + g it + u it + " s it .
This model can be estimated using the true individual e¤ects model of Kutlu et al. (2017) .
Multi-Output Firms
Single-output scenario may be restrictive in some contexts such as banking (e.g., Berger and Hannan, 1998; Koetter at al., 2012; and Kutlu, 2012b) . Therefore, we provide a conduct parameter model with multi-output …rms. Without loss of generality, we assume that there are two outputs and the corresponding demands are represented by P 1 (Q) and P 2 (Q) where Q = (Q 1 ; Q 2 ) is the market output vector. The cost function for …rm i is C i (q i ) where q i = (q 1i ; q 2i ) represents the …rm output vector. The pro…t function for …rm i is given by: it = P 1 (Q t ) q 1it + P 2 (Q t ) q 2it C it (q i ) .
Hence, perceived marginal revenues for outputs are: 2 r2 represent the corresponding marginal cost ine¢ ciencies additively so that c 1it = c 1it + r 1it and c 2it = c 2it + r 2it ; and " s 1it and " s 2it are the usual two-sided error terms. After estimating the demand equations, these supply equations can be estimated separately using stochastic frontier methods that we described above.
Dynamic Strategic Interactions
A formal treatment of conduct parameter games in which the strategic interactions of the …rms are dynamic is beyond the scope of this study. However, following Puller (2009), we recommend including time …xed-e¤ects, which may condition out the dynamic e¤ects in …rms'optimization problems. 36 Even though the estimates of parameters (including parameters of the conduct and e¢ ciency) are consistent in this dynamic game scenario, we cannot separately identify the e¢ cient marginal costs, c it , and dynamic correction terms because the time dummies capture not only cost related unobserved factors that change over time but also the dynamic correction terms. 37 Nevertheless, except for the portion of time …xed-e¤ects that contribute to c it , the other parameters of c it are identi…ed. Moreover, many times c it is not the main interest. In our empirical example, we assume a static model, which is not subject to these identi…cation issues.
Finally, it is possible to extend the dynamic model of Kutlu and Sickles (2012) using similar procedures that we presented. However, since their game theoretical model estimates market-time speci…c conducts, the extension of this model would estimate market-time speci…c conduct and marginal cost e¢ ciency.
